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ORIGINALISM AND ITS DISCONTENTS
(PLUS A THOUGHT OR TWO ABOUT
ABORTION)
Mitchell N. Berman*
1

In Abortion and Original Meaning, Jack Balkin presents an
intriguing new argument for the soundness of the result, though
2
not the reasoning, of Roe v. Wade. Balkin is one of his generation’s widest ranging and most consistently engaging legal theorists, and his analyses of the original principles undergirding the
Fourteenth Amendment and how they bear on the debate over
abortion is characteristically thought-provoking. But they are offered in service of a “larger purpose”—namely, “to demonstrate
why the debate between originalism and living constitutionalism
3
rests on a false dichotomy.” Once we “reject the assumption
that fidelity to the [constitutional] text means fidelity to original
expected application,” Balkin contends, we ought instead to
agree that “constitutional interpretation requires fidelity to the
original meaning of the Constitution and to the principles that
4
underlie the text.” In maintaining such fidelity, however,
“[e]ach generation makes the Constitution their Constitution by
calling upon its text and its principles and arguing about what
5
they mean in their own time.” It follows, Balkin claims, that
“[t]he choice between original meaning and living constitutional6
ism . . . is a false choice.”

* Bernard J. Ward Centennial Professor in Law, The University of Texas at Austin. E-mail: mberman@law.utexas.edu.
1. Jack M. Balkin, Abortion and Original Meaning, 24 CONST. COMMENT. 291
(2007).
2. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
3. Balkin, supra note 1, at 292.
4. Id. at 293.
5. Id. at 301
6. Id. at 293. See also id. at 306 (“The tradition of continuous arguments about
how best to implement constitutional meaning in our own time produces changes in constitutional doctrines, practices, and law. That is why, ultimately, there is no conflict between fidelity to text and principle and practices of constitutionalism that evolve over
time.”).
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I believe that Balkin mischaracterizes contemporary
originalism. Although Justice Scalia constitutes a striking—but
possibly only partial—counter-example, an overwhelming number of contemporary constitutional theorists who actively defend
originalism have already rejected the assumption that Balkin
asks them to reject. While there does exist a live intramural disagreement among originalists concerning whether to abide by
the originally intended meaning of the framers (or ratifiers) of
constitutional text or the text’s original public meaning, almost
nobody espouses fidelity to the originally expected applications.
More important, though, is what follows once we all reject
7
what Ronald Dworkin dubbed “expectation originalism.”
Balkin’s conclusion that originalism and non-originalism present
a false choice rests squarely on his argument that fidelity to the
Constitution requires fidelity to its original meaning and precludes contemporary interpreters from interpreting its text in ac8
cordance with other principles that the text can bear. But nonoriginalists simply do not agree that fidelity to the Constitution
requires fidelity to the original meaning “and the principles it
9
was designed to enact.” And nothing in Balkin’s article, I will
argue, should convince them that what they see as a true choice
is in fact a false one. In short, then, Abortion and Original Meaning is unlikely to make anybody happy: Its empirical claims
about the state of originalist argumentation are apt to gall the
originalists, while its normative (or perhaps conceptual) claims
about what constitutional interpretation requires will fail to
move the non-originalists. Part I of these remarks argues that
theorists in both camps have reason to be dissatisfied.
Of course, even if Balkin’s claims about interpretive theory
fail, his narrower arguments about abortion rights might nonetheless succeed. Unfortunately, I do not believe that Balkin offers us a sounder basis upon which to rest the conclusion that
legislative prohibition of abortion is unconstitutional. Part II
briefly explains why.

7. Ronald Dworkin, Comment, in A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL
COURTS AND THE LAW 115, 119 (Amy Gutman ed., 1997).
8. See, e.g., Balkin, supra note 1, at 303 (“We look to underlying principles because when the text uses relatively abstract and general concepts, we must know which
principles the text presumes or is attempting to embrace. If we read the text to presume
or embrace other principles, then we may be engaged in a play on words and we will not
be faithful to the Constitution’s purposes.”).
9. Id. at 293 (emphasis added).

!!BERMAN-242-ORIGINALISM AND ITS DISCONTENTS2.DOC

2007]

3/5/2008 2:47:28 PM

ORIGINALISM AND ITS DISCONTENTS

385

I. ORIGINALISM AND LIVING CONSTITUTIONALISM
A. EXPECTATION ORIGINALISM: NOT A TRUE OPPONENT
According to Balkin, self-described originalists, along with
their adversaries, believe that expected applications of constitutional provisions are binding on present-day interpreters. This,
10
he argues, is an unsatisfactory view. I agree. The question,
though, is whether it’s a live one. After all, the view was addressed at length a decade ago—and, I would have thought, demolished—in an important article by Mark Greenberg and
11
Harry Litman. As they explained, “original meaning, properly
understood, must contemplate the possibility that a traditional
12
practice is unconstitutional.” In part, this is because, as they argued with care, “requiring fidelity to original practices is inconsistent with interpreting constitutional provisions to stand for
13
principles.” Not surprisingly, then, leading academic defenders
of originalism have been disavowing expectation originalism for
years. Writing just last year in the Yale Law Journal, for example, Michael Paulsen protested that it is “a caricature of originalism” to portray it as “a version of crude intentionalism that focuses on the specific subjective intentions or expectations of
14
individuals as to how a provision might be applied.” Michael
McConnell was even more blunt. “[N]o reputable originalist,
with the possible exception of Raoul Berger, takes the view that
the Framers’ ‘assumptions and expectations about the correct
application’ of their principles is controlling,” he argued a decade ago. “Mainstream originalists recognize that the Framers’
analysis of particular applications could be wrong, or that cir15
cumstances could have changed and made them wrong.”

10. I am disinclined, however, to second Balkin’s claim that “[t]he basic problem
with looking to original expected application for guidance is that it is inconsistent with so
much of our existing constitutional traditions.” Balkin, supra note 1, at 297. I am disposed, rather, to think that the most formidable objection to expectation originalism is
grounded in our best understanding of the logical structure of constitutional adjudication.
But that’s another story.
11. Mark D. Greenberg & Harry Litman, The Meaning of Original Meaning, 86
GEO. L.J. 569 (1998).
12. Id. at 570–71.
13. Id. at 571.
14. Michael Stokes Paulsen, How To Interpret the Constitution (and How Not To),
115 YALE L.J.. 2037, 2059 (2006).
15. Michael W. McConnell, The Importance of Humility in Judicial Review: A
Comment on Ronald Dwokin’s “Moral Reading” of the Constitution, 65 FORD. L. REV.
1269, 1284 (1997).
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16

Swimming against this tide, Balkin asserts loosely that
“[o]riginalists generally assume that if we do not apply the constitutional text in the way it was originally understood at the
time of its adoption we are not following what the words mean
and so will not be faithful to the Constitution as law,” and that
“they have tended to conflate two different ideas—the expected
application of constitutional texts, which is not binding law, and
17
the original meaning, which is.” “Many originalists,” he adds,
“have encouraged this conflation . . . [and] living constitutional18
ists too have mostly accepted this conflation without question.”
But the evidence offered of this supposed general assumption
and tendency toward conflation is sparse. In fact, the only
originalist theorist Balkin discusses at any length is Justice Scalia
who, says Balkin, “insists that the concepts and principles underlying [the constitutional text] must be applied in the same way
19
that they would have been applied when they were adopted.”
As I read him, Scalia’s relationship to expectation originalism is more complex. In response to Dworkin’s distinction between semantic and expectation originalism, after all, Scalia did
expressly avow his allegiance to the original public meaning of
the constitutional text and disavow fidelity to “the concrete ex20
pectations of lawgivers.” On the other hand, Balkin is surely
correct that much of Scalia’s writing, both academic and judicial,
does appear to endorse and rely upon the expectation originalism that he purports to reject. Because Scalia’s efforts to explain
21
away the apparent disparity ring, to me at least, rather false,
16. See also, e.g., Randy E. Barnett, An Originalism for Nonoriginalists, 45 LOYOLA
L. REV. 611, 622 (1999) (endorsing Dworkin’s distinction between “semantic” and “expectations” originalism, and explaining that the new brand of originalists are unconcerned with “how the relevant generation of ratifiers expected or intended their textual
handiwork would be applied to specific cases . . . except as circumstantial evidence of
what the more technical words and phrases in the text might have meant to a reasonable
listener”); Eric J. Segall, A Century Lost: The End of the Originalism Debate, 15 CONST.
COMMENT. 411, 429–32 (1998) (arguing that no contemporary originalists endorse expectation originalism).
17. Balkin, supra note 1, at 292.
18. Id. at 292–93.
19. Id. at 295.
20. Antonin Scalia, Response, in A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION, supra note 7, at
129, 144.
21. The most often noted example of Scalia’s seeming attachment to expectation
originalism—remarked on by both Dworkin and Laurence Tribe in their separate comments on Scalia’s Tanner Lecture—is his view that capital punishment cannot run afoul
of the Eighth Amendment’s ban on cruel and unusual punishments because it is contemplated elsewhere in the constitutional text. See Scalia, Common-Law Courts in a CivilLaw System: The Role of United States Federal Courts in Interpreting the Constitution and
Laws, in A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION, supra note 7, at 3, 46; Antonin Scalia,
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determining how best to make sense of Scalia’s conflicting sig22
nals is no mean feat. I won’t try. Despite my quibbling, then,
I’m content for present purposes to accept Balkin’s description
of Scalia as a proponent of expectation originalism.
But even granting Scalia, who else? As best I could tell,
Balkin cites only three other proponents of the expectation
originalism that is his target —Robert Bork, Raoul Berger, and
23
Clarence Thomas. Frankly, I am uncertain about Berger and
Thomas; we are not favored with page citations or parentheticals
that might either substantiate Balkin’s claim or at least help us to
24
assess it. But the inclusion of Bork on this list strikes me as misOriginalism: The Lesser Evil, 57 U. CIN. L. REV. 849, 863 (1989); Laurence H. Tribe,
Comment, in A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION, supra note 7, at 65, 66; Dworkin, supra
note 7, at 120.
Scalia’s response to the objection that his argument here seems to be expectationist
is to describe the original meaning of the relevant part of the Eighth Amendment as a
bar to the infliction of punishments that “we consider cruel today.” Scalia, supra note 20,
at 145. If that was the original public meaning, then the endorsement of capital punishment in the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process, Double Jeopardy, and Grand Jury Clauses
is simply evidence—very powerful evidence to be sure, but evidence only—that the death
penalty does not fall within the extension of the concept of what Americans considered
cruel in 1791.
What makes this explanation unpersuasive, in my view, is the premise that the original public meaning of “cruel” was “what we consider cruel today” rather than, well,
“what is cruel.” Such a premise must be predicated, I think, on the view that the Constitution (or at least the Eighth Amendment) does not constitutionalize moral principles as
such but only the ratifying generation’s understanding of the moral principle. And that
this is indeed Scalia’s view is suggested by his reference to “the moral perceptions of the
time.” Id. (emphases added and omitted).
To be sure, this could have been the original meaning of the text. But it is hardly the
text’s most natural or obvious rendering. Moreover, Scalia seems to forget himself when
concluding, in the very next sentence, that, in light of the Fifth Amendment, “it is entirely clear that capital punishment, which was widely in use in 1791, does not violate the
abstract moral principle of the Eighth Amendment.” Id. So which is it: the Eighth
Amendment purports to (was understood to) constitutionalize an abstract moral principle or it purports to (was understood to) constitutionalize society’s beliefs about moral
principles? That Scalia cannot have it both ways should be apparent to a moral realist.
But I don’t think that even moral anti-realism offers a way out. While anti-realists of
some stripes would indeed maintain that an attempt to constitutionalize a moral principle
can only amount to constitutionalization of the society’s beliefs about moral principles, it
does not follow that this truth forms any part of the content of the public understanding
of the relevant text. Put another way, the public meaning or understanding of a text that
purports to constitutionalize a moral principle is likely to include reference to society’s
beliefs about the supposed moral principle only in a society of anti-realists.
22. For further evidence of Scalia’s inconsistencies on this question see Segall, supra note 16, at 427–29.
23. See Balkin, supra note 1, at 295 n.9.
24. Balkin’s evidence for including Thomas among the small number of expectation
originalists is a seven-page lecture published over a decade ago. Clarence Thomas, Judging, 45 U. KAN. L. REV. 1 (1996). For myself, I see nothing in the speech that suggests
expectation originalism, and perhaps some evidence to the contrary. See id. at 5–6
(“When it comes time to interpret the Constitution’s provisions, such as, for instance, the
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taken—and revealingly so. Of the two pages in The Tempting of
America to which Balkin draws our attention, one (page 159) has
no obvious bearing on the question at all. And on the other page
(144) Bork’s point is solely to make clear, in the face of apparently conflicting views he had expressed two decades earlier, that
he espouses original meaning originalism over original intent
originalism; that is, he favors the original public meaning of the
text over the subjective semantic intentions of any specific individuals. But this is not to espouse fidelity to the original expectations the framers or ratifiers might have had about how the textual meaning would apply.
Were there any real doubt about this, consider Bork’s famously unpersuasive effort to establish that Brown v. Board of
Education is consistent with originalism. That argument, most
readers will recall, runs like this: the original understanding of
the Equal Protection Clause incorporated the principle of
“equality” or “equality before the law”; the ratifiers believed or
assumed that racial segregation was consistent with such equality; and, when the inconsistency became apparent, the Court
properly gave effect to the originally understood principle and
not to the originally expected, though mistaken, application of
25
26
that principle. Whatever the argument’s faults, it rests
squarely on Borks rejection of expectation originalism and his
endorsement of something very much like the meaning-andprinciple originalism that Balkin favors—though admittedly
without Balkin’s emphasis on the plasticity, contestability or fluidity of underlying principles.
Perhaps Balkin is misled into thinking that expectation
originalism is more widespread than it is by his view that
“[w]hen people use the term ‘original understanding,’ and sometimes even ‘original meaning’–as Scalia does–they are actually
27
talking about original expected application.” Again, the basis

Speech or Press Clauses of the First Amendment, reasonable minds can certainly differ
as to their exact meaning. But that does not mean that there is no right or correct answer;
that there are no clear, eternal principles recognized and put into motion by our founding
documents.”) (emphasis added).
25. See ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE POLITICAL
SEDUCTION OF THE LAW 81–83 (1990).
26. The most glaring fault is that Bork renders the original understanding at such a
high level of generality—“equality” and “equality before the law”—as to sacrifice
originalism’s pretensions to serious historical inquiry and its promise to impose meaningful constraints on judges.
27. Balkin, supra note 1, at 296.
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for this claim escapes me; indeed, I think the claim is unlikely to
be true.
For a keen illustration, consider how Justice Scalia analyzed
28
the question, raised in Minnesota v. Dickerson, of whether the
Fourth Amendment permits police to seize contraband detected
29
during a Terry frisk. After insisting that “the terms in the Constitution must be given the meaning ascribed to them at the time
30
of their ratification,” Scalia proceeded to recognize that the
scope of the application of those terms could change. “[E]ven if
a ‘frisk’ prior to arrest would have been considered impermissible in 1791 . . . perhaps it is only since that time that concealed
weapons capable of harming the interrogator quickly . . . have
become common—which might alter the judgment of what is
31
‘reasonable’ under the original standard.” Here, original meaning is expressly distinguished from original expected application.
Or take the constitutional grounds for impeachment: “trea32
son, bribery, or other high crimes and misdemeanors.” One
who emphasizes that we should follow the 1789 meaning of the
word misdemeanor—serious wrongdoing—and not its current
meaning—minor offense—would be most unlikely to think a
president impeachable for all and only those offenses that were
considered serious in 1791. To the contrary, as to any conduct
(oh, I don’t know—adultery?) that would have been considered
a misdemeanor in 1789 under the 1789 definition and that is considered a misdemeanor in 2007 under the 2007 definition—i.e.,
some conduct that was deemed to be serious wrongdoing in 1789
but is only a petty offense today—the point of advocating fidelity
to the “original meaning” or “original understanding” is precisely to oppose acting in accordance with the “original expected
application.”
Balkin declares portentously that “[t]he concepts embodied
by the words of constitutional text and the principles underlying
the text, and not their original expected application, are the cen33
tral concern of constitutional interpretation.” My point thus far
is that it would be hard to find an originalist who’d dissent.

28. 508 U.S. 366 (1993).
29. This very helpful illustration was (as far as I know) initially provided in Lawrence Lessig, Understanding Changed Readings: Fidelity and Theory, 47 STAN L. REV.
395, 398–99 (1995), and reintroduced in Segall, supra note 16, at 428–29.
30. 508 U.S. at 379 (Scalia, J., concurring).
31. Id. at 382.
32. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 4.
33. Balkin, supra note 1, at 302.
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B. BALKINIAN ORIGINALISM AND LIVING
CONSTITUTIONALISM: NOT A FALSE CHOICE
Conceivably, one could respond to this objection by marshaling more evidence to support the empirical proposition that
many theorists of originalism do in fact espouse expectations
originalism. Such a showing would surprise me but would scrape
no skin off my own, non-originalist, nose. But Balkin is more
likely, I think, to deflect the objection by insisting that it targets
a matter of only minor importance. The key claims in Abortion
and Original Meaning, he might say, are not empirical but conceptual or normative. They concern, not how many originalists
presently endorse expectation originalism, but what follows once
we reject it.
I agree that this is the claim of importance. Nonetheless, the
attention I have given Balkin’s empirical contentions is still warranted. For one thing, a surprising number of other smart and
careful scholars appear to believe, just as Balkin does, that ex34
pectation originalism enjoys vibrant support. It seems plausible
to suppose that a sedulous effort (which I do not claim to have
undertaken) to confirm or falsify this assumption might have
some effect on how the debate over originalism will continue to
unfold. Furthermore, and of more particular present relevance,
readers who agree that almost nobody of any seriousness accepts
expectation originalism should recognize as well that almost everybody even among the originalists appreciates that correct applications of the constitutional meaning can change over time.
35
Indeed, McConnell insisted on precisely this a decade ago. So if
living constitutionalism is merely the view that correct applications of constitutional meaning can change over time—i.e., that
conduct constitutional at time t1 can become unconstitutional at
t2 (or vice versa)—then, sure, originalism embraces living constitutionalism. But the near-universal assumption is that living constitutionalism accommodates diachronic change different in
character and magnitude from what originalism permits. I assume that it is this contention that Balkin aims to deny when
averring that originalism and living constitutionalism present “a
false choice.” And if that is his object, it must be accomplished
not by his rejection of expectation originalism but by his affirma-

34. See, e.g., KERMIT ROOSEVELT III, THE MYTH OF JUDICIAL ACTIVISM 47–58
(2006); Aileen Kavanagh, Original Intention, Enacted Text, and Constitutional Interpretation, 47 AM. J. JURIS. 255, 265 (2002).
35. See McConnell, supra note 15; see also, e.g., Lessig, supra note 29, at 396.
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tion of what he calls “the method of text and principle.” So if
Balkin’s “false choice” claim is itself false, it will not be because
originalists reject his method of text and principle but because
37
living constitutionalists do. One important upshot of the argument in Section I.A, then, is to underscore that the readers he
must seek to persuade are not the originalists but their opponents.
The remainder of this Part argues: that living constitutionalists do reject Balkin’s method; that Balkin provides no argument
for why they ought not to reject it; and that, to the contrary,
much of Balkin’s focus on extrajudicial constitutional interpretation and the role of social movements (a rightful and illuminating focus, in my view) should lead him to join the living constitutionalists in rejecting the method of text and principle that he
advocates.
1.
What reason could anyone have for rejecting the method of
text and principle? Could it really be that constitutional interpretation does not “require[] fidelity to the original meaning of the
Constitution and to the principles that underlie the text”? Much
depends, I think, on what is meant by the recurring and ambiguous phrase: “the principles that underlie the text.”
Taken in isolation, the phrase permits at least two distinct
interpretations: the principles that, in a Dworkinian vein, make
best sense of the text or show it in its morally best light; or the
principles that in actual historical fact were intended by the
framers, or understood by the ratifiers, to be captured by the

36. Balkin, supra note 1, at 293.
37. A note on terminology: In my opinion, the negation of originalism is more
felicitously rendered not as living constitutionalism but as non-originalism. Very briefly, I
take originalism to be the view that some specified class of constitutional interpreters
(paradigmatically judges, but, on some accounts, everybody) owes a strict obligation of
fidelity to some aspect of the Constitution’s original character—that the interpreters
must always follow the original object, at least when it is adequately discoverable. The
negation of this view—i.e., the claim that it is not the case that interpreters owe strict fidelity to the specified aspect of the Constitution’s original character—would be, simply,
non-originalism. In arguing that, over at least some range of cases, interpreters ought to
abandon original meaning (intent, understanding, principles, or what-have-you) in favor
of contemporary meanings or values, living constitutionalism comprises a subset of nonoriginalism but is not entailed by it. In any event, as the distinction I favor between nonoriginalism and living constitutionalism is not essential to a diagnosis of what I take to be
unsatisfactory in Balkin’s account, I follow him in contrasting originalism to living constitutionalism.
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38

chosen text. In fact, though, Balkin makes adequately clear that
he means the latter, not the former. What we are searching for,
he explains, are “the general principles that animated the
39
text” —those that the people who drafted the text “sought to
40
endorse,” “sought to refer to,” or “sought to establish.”
Balkin’s method of text and principle, we might say, is a method
of text and original principle. Living constitutionalists, in contrast, might be thought to employ a method of text and evolving
or contemporary principle.
To appreciate the difference, consider any constitutional
provision, T, that is most appropriately read as referring to a
moral principle, not just to a legal rule or even a standard. Now
suppose that T is sufficiently vague or ambiguous to accommodate or refer to two (or more) distinct moral principles, P1 and
P2. Finally, imagine that an interpreter is convinced that P1 is the
superior moral principle, both by her own lights and by the lights
of a substantial majority of the contemporary populace, yet that,
according to the best historical evidence, the framers and ratifiers of T sought to refer to P2. The question is whether our interpreter’s obligation of fidelity to the Constitution entails an obligation to adopt P2 as her constitutional interpretation—as her
understanding, that is, of what the Constitution means. Balkin’s
method of text and original principle seems to answer that she
does. The living constitutionalist’s interpretive method (or at
least a possible method of living constitutionalism) answers that
she does not.
This abstract problematic can be made more concrete. Consider, to start, the Free Exercise Clause. Whereas the framers
might have sought thereby to endorse the principle that all religious believers ought to be entitled to worship as they choose,
we might now pay more allegiance to the kindred—but distinct—moral principle that all persons, believers, agnostics and
atheists alike, should be entitled to worship, or not, as they
choose. The Free Speech Clause might have been drafted and
ratified to endorse a principle related to democratic self-

38. Underlie means “to be the support or basis of.” AMERICAN HERITAGE
DICTIONARY 1318 (2d ed. 1982); WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL
DICTIONARY 2489 (Philip Babcock Grove ed., 1993) (“to be at the basis of: form the
foundation of: support”). A principle could provide moral support for the text in the
sense of justifying our contemporary obedience to it, or respect for it; or it could provide
causal support in the sense of explaining why the text was adopted.
39. Balkin, supra note 1, at 302 (emphasis added).
40. Id. at 303, 319.
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governance; today, perhaps, we understand it to embody a principle of individual self-realization. The framers and ratifiers of
the Self-incrimination Clause might have aimed merely to outlaw a particular historical practice and not to refer to a moral
principle at all; today, perhaps, we understand it to endorse a
principle of human dignity.
41
While examples of this sort could be multiplied, we might
finish by returning to our previous discussion of Bork’s flimsy
defense of Brown. The defense seems lame precisely because we
do not think that equality, simpliciter is an accurate rendering of
the principle that the framers and ratifiers of the Fourteenth
Amendment actually sought to endorse. We believe that the
animating principle was more determinate than that—civil equality, or formal equality, or anti-subordination, or equal regard, or
color-blindness, etc. Living constitutionalists would permit interpreters to eschew whatever equality-type principle the framers
and ratifiers actually “sought to endorse” in favor of the equality-type principle—a principle, mind you, that the text can
bear—that better suits our contemporary needs and moral values.
Balkin is far from the first scholar to conclude that a focus
on constitutional principles effaces the originalism/non42
originalism distinction. But because an approach of the sort just
sketched plainly allows for greater flexibility of bottom-line result than does the Balkinian approach that permits interpreters
to argue only about different applications of the originally intended principle, it seems to follow that originalism and living
constitutionalism continue to offer a true, rather than false,
choice.
41. Keep in mind that these examples are offered only to further illustrate how living constitutionalism could differ from Balkin’s method of text and original principle. For
this limited purpose, lengthy argument about the relevant history is quite beside the
point. I assume that it is similarly unnecessary at this stage to elaborate on a theory of
how to individuate moral principles.
42. See, e.g., Segall, supra note 16, at 432–33 (“Once strict originalism [i.e., expectation originalism] is taken off the table, and it has been off the table for a long time, there
are no stakes left to arguing about the originalism question. . . . Th[e] move from specific
intentions to general principles . . . eliminates any meaningful distinction between
originalism and non-originalism because the Constitution’s broad phrases are defined at
a level of generality that make them useless in hard cases for anything other than symbolic purposes.”); Lawrence B. Solum, Originalism as Transformative Politics, 63 TUL. L.
REV. 1599, 1612–13 (1989); ROOSEVELT, supra note 34, at 47–58 (arguing that the importance of the originalism/living constitutionalism debate “is drastically overstated,” but
starting, like Balkin, from what I have argued is the mistaken premise that “living constitutionalists and originalists share th[e] assumption” that originalism prescribes fidelity to
originally expected applications).
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2.
To conclude that the “false choice” thesis is itself false is not
yet, of course, to suggest that the alternatives are equally attractive or even that the method favored by living constitutionalism
ought to be considered truly eligible. Perhaps, that is, living constitutionalism offers no true choice as against originalism not because it directs interpreters to act just as originalism, properly
understood, does, but because the competing direction it provides cannot be defended. Unfortunately, Abortion and Original
Meaning does not appear to develop any arguments to that effect. Instead, Balkin treats the proposition that constitutional interpretation requires “fidelity to the words of the text, understood in terms of their original meaning, and to the principles
that [originally] underlie the text” as an essentially undefended
43
“premise” or “assumption.”
Addressing all the arguments that have been provided elsewhere against living constitutionalism would require a paper of
its own. Here, I can offer only a much-condensed sketch of why
Balkin’s own trenchant analysis of social movements suggests
that his proposed method of text and original principle is actually less faithful to our practice, and less attractive, than is the
living constitutionalists’ method of, let us say, text and evolving
principle.
The basic tension in Balkin’s account arises from his privileging of extra-judicial constitutional interpretation. “Theories
of constitutional interpretation,” he says, “should start with in44
terpretation by citizens as the standard case.” Social movements in particular serve as principal drivers of constitutional
understandings, “constitutional culture,” and “constitutional
45
doctrine.” But social movements do not view their task as
maintaining fidelity to the past. “Restoration” and “redemption”
46
might be their “key tropes,” but we should not confuse rhetoric
with reality. The truth is that citizens, social movements, and political parties do more than argue about “how best to apply”
originally intended constitutional principles in contemporary cir47
cumstances. They argue as well about what the constitutional
principles are—which is why those who would challenge a given

43.
44.
45.
46.
47.

Balkin, supra note 1, at 294–95, 302.
Id. at 307.
Id. at 308.
Id. at 301.
E.g., id. at 293.
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movement’s agenda often argue not that it applies the originally
understood principle incorrectly, but that the principle it pushes
is not of constitutional stature at all. This, for example, is how
the defenders of affirmative action respond to the living constitutionalists (masquerading as crusaders for originalism, as living
constitutionalists frequently do) who champion a constitutional
principle of color-blindness.
And if a movement prevails in persuading the general public to accept the principle it puts forth as a constitutional one?
Well, as far as I can tell, Balkin provides no reason why judicial
interpretation should not follow suit, least of all that judicial resistance to a successful extrajudicial interpretation not predicated on historical fidelity is categorically mandated. To the contrary, that judicial interpretation may follow and endorse nonoriginalist but popularly accepted constitutional interpretations
is, I take it, at least part of what it means for judicial interpreta48
tion to be “parasitic” upon extrajudicial interpretation. No
doubt one could maintain that courts must refuse to sanction the
new extrajudicial understanding of constitutional principle that
the successful social movement has wrought on the grounds that
that understanding lacks historical fidelity and therefore legitimacy. But such an attitude would, I think, rest on either a bizarre misconception of what social movements are for—they
serve, after all, as advocates for a vision of the political good, not
as historians—or an unrealistic sense of how long courts might
(or should) stand against successful popular mobilizations. It’s
49
hard to see Jack Balkin falling into either error.

48. Id. at 307. Incidentally, I am in substantial agreement with Balkin’s ruminations
about the relationship between constitutional doctrine and constitutional interpretation—most notably the idea, see, e.g., id. at 307, 314–15, that judge-announced constitutional doctrine serves to implement, and is therefore not identical to, judicial interpretations of constitutional meaning. See, e.g., Mitchell N. Berman, Constitutional Decision
Rules, 90 VA. L. REV. 1 (2004); Mitchell N. Berman, Aspirational Rights and the TwoOutput Thesis, 119 HARV. L. REV. F. 220 (2006), http://www.harvardlawreview.org/ forum/issues/119/march06/berman.pdf. I am very skeptical, though, that a proper understanding of this distinction will provide any avenue of escape from the conclusion in the
text.
49. See, e.g., Jack M. Balkin, Roe v. Wade: An Engine of Controversy, in WHAT
ROE V. WADE SHOULD HAVE SAID 3, 23–24 (Jack M. Balkin ed. 2005) (“[C]ourts,
whether they like it or not, always work in conversation with the political branches in
developing constitutional norms. . . . The work of courts, important as it may be, is always
an intermediate and intermediary feature of a much longer process of legal development
that stretches back into the past and forward into the future.”).
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II. ABORTION
Even if the larger ambition of Abortion and Original Meaning is to reshape debates over constitutional interpretation generally, the greater bulk of the piece explores the original meaning
of the Fourteenth Amendment and draws forth implications for
the abortion debate. In the smallest of nutshells, Balkin argues
that the various clauses of section 1 of that amendment were intended to constitutionalize, among other things, a principle of
equal citizenship and a prohibition on class legislation. Laws that
criminalize even first-trimester abortion violate these principles,
and are therefore unconstitutional, even though the framers and
ratifiers of the Fourteenth Amendment might not have so realized.
This is deeply interesting stuff, though I am insufficiently
knowledgeable of the relevant history and secondary literature
to assess it very intelligently. My principal critical reaction, however, is to question whether Balkin’s historical and interpretive
claims are either necessary or sufficient to support the holding in
Roe.
The ordinary, perhaps inescapable, path toward justifying
the conclusion that legislative prohibitions on early-stage abortions are unconstitutional consists of two steps: Establishing,
first, that prohibitions on early stage abortions require weighty
justification; and second, that the state’s interest in protecting
the life, and opportunity for birth, of the unborn fetus does not
supply a justification of requisite weight. Of the two, the first is
much the easier.
Balkin’s argument is geared principally to tackling that first
task—that is, to establishing that there exists a constitutional
50
right to choose an abortion. But even granting its plausibility, I
confess to thinking that the more usual move, of the sort hinted
at in Roe and developed somewhat further in Casey, is adequate
too. Roughly, and without elaboration or defense, I take that argument to be: (1) that various constitutional clauses—the Privilege and Immunities Clause, the Due Process Clauses, and the
Ninth Amendment among them—are appropriately interpreted
to provide heightened protection for liberty interests of special
importance to the individual’s prospects for realizing a life of
meaning and fulfillment; and (2) that a pregnant woman’s inter-

50. Actually, he argues provocatively that there exist two distinct constitutional
rights to abortion. For purposes of my concern, however, we can put that wrinkle aside.
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est in terminating her pregnancy qualifies as an interest of precisely this sort. In short, then, I think that Balkin’s analysis is
very possibly adequate, but not necessary, to the first step on the
path to the conclusion that abortion prohibitions are unconstitutional.
51
In any event, this is, as I have said, the easier step. The
more challenging one is to establish that protection of the unborn does not provide the justification needed—that prohibitions on abortion do not merely implicate or infringe a constitutional right to choose an abortion, but violate it. On this score,
however, Balkin offers very little. To be sure, he does argue that
a fetus is not properly understood as a person within the mean52
ing of the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses. And I
fully agree. But I think that most abortion opponents do too.
Unfortunately, this conclusion does not get Balkin where he
needs to go, for the compelling interests that a state might pursue are not limited to the protection of constitutional persons. If
fetuses are persons in the morally relevant sense, or if they are
moral rights-bearing entities, then it seems likely, perhaps obvious, that the state’s interest in protecting them should suffice to
justify infringements on the constitutional rights of pregnant
women. Some response to this objection is required, I should
think, to justify the result in Roe. Because I do not think Balkin
supplies an adequate response in this paper—indeed, it is not
clear to me that he supplies any response at all—I conclude that
his analysis of abortion, while surely of interest, is neither necessary nor sufficient to establish that the state may not criminalize
first-trimester abortions.
The great oddity is that, elsewhere, Balkin did expressly
recognize the need for supporters of the Roe result to go beyond
the “fetuses are not constitutional persons” argument. In the
mock opinion he produced for his edited volume, What Roe v.
Wade Should Have Said: The Nation’s Top Legal Experts Rewrite America’s Most Controversial Decision, Balkin (writing
51. Critics of the abortion right often seem to view the diversity of arguments advanced to ground the right as evidence of the proponents’ result-orientedness, even of
their moral or intellectual bankruptcy. I see it, instead, as largely a consequence of scholars’ efforts (perhaps unnecessary, but sincerely felt) to identify textual homes for a right
that is more forthrightly derived by structural reasoning. When one thinks, not of bits of
text viewed piecemeal, but of the Constitution’s broad and deep commitment to principles of individual liberty and equality, the conclusion that legislative prohibitions of abortion cannot stand unless supported by weighty justification strikes me wholly overdetermined.
52. Balkin, supra note 1, at 333–337.
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then as Chief Justice Balkin) reasoned that the precise contours
of most abortion laws—most notably, the exceptions they frequently grant for pregnancies produced as a result of rape or incest and their total exemption from criminal liability of the pregnant woman herself—undermine the regulating states’
contentions that they genuinely ascribe moral personhood to the
53
nonviable fetus. This is a not-uncommon argumentative strat54
egy, and one with which I have considerable sympathy.
In skeletal form, the version of the argument that I favor
rests on the notion that all laws reflect a balancing of interests
and that a law prohibiting abortion could reflect two very different types of balancing. To oversimplify, the law could issue from
a recognition that the costs that the law imposes on women is
very substantial, but that the benefits (in terms of protection of
an entity with a moral status equivalent, or roughly equivalent,
to persons already born) are even greater. Alternatively, it could
be based on a judgment that fetuses do not have the moral status
of persons, and therefore that the state’s interests in prohibiting
abortion (interests that can include, but need not be limited to,
the protection of potential life) fall rather short of compelling,
but that interests of such weight nonetheless outweigh the countervailing liberty interests of women. In shorthand, we might say
that the law could be understood by its drafters and proponents
as either high-cost/higher-benefit or low-cost/medium-benefit.
Now, if the judiciary were in a position to conclude that a
nonviable fetus does, or does not, have the moral status akin to a
neonate, then the understanding about the moral status of the
fetus held by the state (so to speak) would be, I think, neither
here nor there. If a nonviable fetus lacks substantial moral
status, then prohibitions on early-stage abortion do not serve a
compelling interest regardless of what the state believes. Similarly (though possibly not quite as obviously), if the nonviable
fetus does have substantial moral status, then early-stage abortion bans do serve a compelling interest even if the state thinks
that they don’t. But the judiciary is not positioned to make either
such conclusion. And that’s why the state legislature’s actual beliefs about the moral status of the fetus become critical.

53. Jack M. Balkin, (judgment of the Court), in WHAT ROE V. WADE SHOULD
HAVE SAID, supra note 49, at 31, 47–52.
54. See, e.g., ROOSEVELT, supra note 34, at 118–30; Guido Calabresi, The Supreme
Court, 1990 Term—Foreword: Antidiscrimination and Constitutional Accountability:
What the Bork-Brennan Debate Ignores, 105 HARV. L. REV. 80 (1991).
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It follows that the question for a judiciary that has determined that the liberty interests of women are constitutionally entitled to great weight, is whether to accept the state’s representation that its restrictions on abortion in fact issue from an
assessment of the first sort and not of the second. To put the
point differently, the state has a compelling interest in protecting
against destruction beings that it reasonably believes have a
moral status equivalent to, or close to, that of a neonate. So in
this unusual case, the judicial question of whether the state’s interest is compelling is parasitic upon what the state actually believes about the nature of the thing that it is endeavoring to protect. But the state has reasons to misrepresent (to the courts,
perhaps even to itself) what its actual beliefs are. So the courts
ought not to simply accept without question the state’s representations as to its actual beliefs. To do so would be to substantially
under-protect the abortion right. How the courts ought to proceed in general—including what inference the Supreme Court
should have drawn about the Texas law in 1973, and what inferences it should draw about the beliefs that have motivated other
abortion laws at other times—are questions that I cannot address here, except to note my conviction that the skeptical inference is sometimes, perhaps often, appropriate.
That no argument of this form appears in Abortion and
Original Meaning is conspicuous and, therefore, most intriguing.
Perhaps it is simple oversight. Or perhaps Balkin has now discerned failings in the argument that had not previously occurred
to him. Either way, I think we need to hear more about why
bans on first-trimester abortions cannot justifiably infringe the
abortion right (even assuming that nonviable fetuses are not,
constitutionally speaking, persons) before we can conclude, with
Balkin, that such bans are unconstitutional.
CONCLUSION
The debate over originalism concerns whether constitutional interpretation must be a search for the original understanding (or intent, or meaning, or the like). It is a debate over
whether the correct meaning of the Constitution—and not just
its case-specific applications—can change from t to t1 even absent constitutional amendment. It seems to me that there can be
only two answers to this question—”yes” and “no”—and that
they conflict. The analysis that would show these answers to pre-

!!BERMAN-242-ORIGINALISM AND ITS DISCONTENTS2.DOC

400

CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY

3/5/2008 2:47:28 PM

[Vol. 24:383
55

sent “a false choice” or to be “opposite sides of the same coin”
is not, I predict, in the cards.
My answer to this central question—an answer that, admittedly, I have not defended here—is affirmative. That makes me a
non-originalist. It seems to me that Balkin’s privileging of constitutional interpretation by social movements (which are compelled neither by logic nor by political morality to maintain historical fidelity), over interpretation by judges, ought to lead him
to answer that question in the affirmative as well. But perhaps
I’m mistaken. Perhaps Balkin really is an originalist. If so, I
would be eager to see his reasons for concluding that the
originalist answer is better than the non-originalist answer, rather
than that the two answers are one.
***
56
In his reply to his commentators, Balkin treats my own
contribution with seriousness, respect, and care. Unfortunately,
much of what he says about my analysis causes me to conclude
that I have not succeeded in making myself entirely clear. Some
response is therefore warranted. Given the length and comprehensiveness of that reply, there are a large number of claims to
which I’d like to respond. But I will limit myself to trying to
make two points. First, I will restate my core criticism of Balkin’s
thesis and explain why I believe that it survives the arguments
that Balkin musters in his reply. Second, I will briefly address
some of the respects in which Balkin’s analysis suggests a misunderstanding of what I have attempted to convey.
Balkin’s “false choice” claim is false
Although Abortion and Original Meaning is rich in arguments, I understand it to advance two core claims—a normative
claim about how the Constitution ought to be interpreted, and
something close to a conceptual claim about the range of possible alternatives to the normative question. The former is his
proposed method of text and principle (which I will call TP), and
the latter is his claim that originalism and living constitutionalism present a false choice (which I will call FC). Stated slightly
more formally, the claims are these:

55. Balkin, supra note 1, at 348.
56. Jack M. Balkin, Original Meaning and Constitutional Redemption, 24 CONST.
COMMENT. 427 (2007).
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TP: “Constitutional interpretation requires fidelity to the
original meaning of the Constitution and to the prin57
ciples that underlie the text.”
FC: There is no difference between originalism and living
constitutionalism because both theories can and
should affirm TP.
My central point has been that Balkin’s “false choice” claim
is incorrect: there is a real choice between originalism and living
constitutionalism. Balkin’s argument to the contrary commits the
fallacy of equivocation. Here, in a condensed presentation, is
how I take my argument to run:
(1) A given text can, and at least some provisions of the
U.S. Constitution do, bear the meaning of more than
one moral principle, i.e., more than one moral principle can be attributed to the same constitutional text.
(2) Therefore, “the principles that underlie the text” is
ambiguous. It can refer to (at least): (a) the principles
that the framers or ratifiers actually sought to constitutionalize by means of the chosen text, or (b) the
moral principles that fit the text and that, from the interpreter’s perspective, best justify our continued
obedience to it.
(3) By substitution, TP comes in at least two variants:
(a) constitutional interpretation requires fidelity to the
original meaning of the Constitution and to the principles that the framers or ratifiers actually sought to
constitutionalize by means of the chosen text; and
(b) constitutional interpretation requires fidelity to
the original meaning of the Constitution and to the
principles that fit the text and that, from the interpreter’s perspective, best justify our continued obedience to it.
(4) Originalism is committed to (a), so call it TP-O; at
least some Living Constitutionalists endorse(b), so call
it TP-L.
(5) TP-O and TP-L are functionally non-equivalent:
When employed in constitutional argument, they will

57. Balkin, supra note 1, at 293; See Balkin, supra note 56, at 428 (“I argue that fidelity to the Constitution means fidelity to the original meaning of the Constitution’s text
and to the principles that underlie the text.”).

!!BERMAN-242-ORIGINALISM AND ITS DISCONTENTS2.DOC

402

CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY

3/5/2008 2:47:28 PM

[Vol. 24:383

not produce identical sets of “interpretations of the
Constitution” or of specific constitutional holdings.
(6) Therefore, FC is false. There is a difference between
originalism and living constitutionalism because the
former and the latter do not endorse variants of TP
that are the same or functionally equivalent.
In the course of my comment, I expressed the view (which I
58
was not alone in holding) that Balkin himself espouses TP-O. I
marshaled evidence for this conclusion from various passages in
59
Abortion and Original Meaning. Balkin addresses this claim at
60
some length in his reply. Suffice it to say, that I now think (but
confess to not being entirely certain) that I got him wrong, that
he does not really mean that interpreters owe fidelity to the
principles that the ratifiers sought to endorse, but only that they
owe fidelity to the principles that the text that the ratifiers did
endorse can bear. As Balkin says, “the key issue is . . . that con61
stitutional principles must be ones ‘that the text can bear.’” In
any event, which view Balkin himself holds is not important to
my argument. The critical point is only that these two positions
exist and that they are not equivalent.
But is that claim mistaken? Balkin challenges some of the
examples I put forth to illustrate my premise (1). In fact, I believe that my particular illustrations survive his challenge. But no
matter. My illustrations were purely illustrative. Even if Balkin
and I end up disagreeing abut individual cases, I see nothing in
his reply that should lead one to question that at least some of
the constitutional text is sufficiently ambiguous to mean or refer
to more than one principle of political morality. To be sure, he
intimates that (1) depends upon the erroneous assumption that
the principles underlying the constitutional text “will have to be
62
stated at a fairly low level of generality.” But I did not take myself to be making any such assumption and, yet more importantly, the premise doesn’t depend upon it. I see nothing else in
Balkin’s reply that would cause trouble for my argument. And
because (2) and (3) follow straightforwardly from (1), and because (4) and (5) would seem uncontroversial given (3), I believe
that my challenge to FC remains sound.
58. See Ethan Leib, The Perpetual Anxiety of Living Constitutionalism, 24 CONST.
COMMENT. 353, 354–56 (2007).
59. See supra notes 39–40 and accompanying text.
60. Balkin, supra note 56, at 487–519.
61. Id. at 488.
62. Id. at 487.
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The method of text and principle
Balkin expends considerable energy elaborating the method
of text and principle, and defending it against attacks from his
critics. I am supposed to be one of those critics. Thus, for example, I am said to object both “that political and social movements
do not use the method of text and principle,” and “that it is dangerous to adopt a constitutional theory that incorporates and jus63
tifies the work of political and social movements.” I do not in
fact believe either of those things, and I am disheartened to learn
that my text has betrayed me so badly.
Of course political and social movements use the method of
64
text and principle (or something like it). What else would they
use? The question is which method of text and principle—TP-O
or TP-L? Probably both, I suppose. But given their aims (which
Balkin describes in rich historical detail and with eloquence) and
their lack of training in historical methods, I conclude that they
mostly employ TP-L. I don’t know what in my paper invited the
conclusion that I believe that social movements “often make
65
claims based on simple policy grounds.” And when I suggested
we can’t trust their rhetoric, I meant only that we cannot blithely
accept whatever claims they might sometimes make to be employing TP-O, not that their “arguments for restoration and re66
demption [are] nothing more than rhetorical tropes.”
Far from believing that a theory that justifies the work of
political and social movements is dangerous, my claim is closer
to the opposite. I believe that the account of the evolution of
constitutional meaning that Balkin describes and champions in
his reply is largely descriptively accurate, largely normatively attractive, and at least partly inescapable for a polity constituted as
ours is. The point of my remarks in Section I.B.2 was to chal-

63. Id. at 504; see also id. at 512–13.
64. The parenthetical in the text is necessitated by my belief that social movements
(as well as judges or individual citizens, for that matter) are not rigidly bound by the
original meaning of textual provisions that state something other than principles. But this
is not the place to elaborate that particular view.
65. Balkin, supra note 56, at 504.
66. Id. at 507 (emphasis added). Admittedly, I probably invited that misunderstanding by contending that “social movements do not view their task as maintaining fidelity
to the past.” Supra at 394. I’m confident that’s not what they view as their principal task.
Their principal task is forward-looking. But in pursuing their forward-looking goals, I
agree that they frequently feel themselves to be maintaining fidelity to at least an imagined past. In short, the truth is more nuanced than my very brief remarks might have
suggested.
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lenge TP-O by suggesting that it does not take social movements
seriously enough. The conclusion rests on three premises.
First, as just discussed, social movements employ TP-L to a
significant extent. Second, the constitutional understandings that
arise by application of TP-L can secure widespread popular endorsement or can underwrite stable governmental practices that
depart from what TP-O would authorize. Third, when that happens, it is at least sometimes appropriate for judicial constitutional interpretation to tract TP-L rather than TP-O. Therefore,
TP-O cannot be correct as a complete or total account even of
how courts ought to perform their role in our scheme of constitu67
tional governance.

67. I have not provided much argument for the critical third premise beyond my
brief remarks in the final paragraph of Section I.B.2, including my observation that
“Balkin provides no reason [against it].” Supra at 395. If Balkin now recognizes that TPO and TP-L are not identical and endorses the latter, then I’d suppose that he accepts the
third premise. But an argument to the contrary might possibly be grounded in Balkin’s
remarks about the value of “preserv[ing] legal meaning over time.” Balkin, supra note 1,
at 429. Surely the preservation of legal meaning across time is a desideratum of a legal
system. But I do not take Balkin to be contending that it is a conclusive demand of logic
or political morality. That, I think, would be quite mistaken.

